Nicholas Papandreou

University of Athens library

Friday September 14, 1999

Nicholas Papandreou, Ph.D.

Last year we were honored to hear Amartya Sen discuss Andreas Papandreou’s work at the Memorial Lecture titled The political element in economic development. Professor Sen used this title on purpose, since it was also the title for Andreas’ 1966 Wicksell lectures. I will not examine Andreas Papandreou’s conception of politics, his belief in man’s freedom or his ideas concerning democracy. I would not be able to go beyond anything that Professor Sen has already said, and furthermore, I would certainly not be able to match the good professor’s eloquence and comprehension of the underlying issues. Suffice it to say that it is clear from Professor Sen’s paper that Andreas Papandreou was extremely interested in making economic theory relevant to society and to the functioning of democracy. I would add from my recent research into Andreas’ work that this tendency is clear from early on.

For those of you interested in professor Sen’s paper — which goes far beyond it’s title and analyses some of the most philosophically exciting concepts of our day – copies are available. Furthermore the Andreas Papandreou Foundation will be publishing it in booklet form in time for the next Memorial Lecture, to be given by Joseph Stiglitz, Chief Economist for the World Bank, on November 15^th.

First of all, what kind of an economist was Andreas Papandreou? Most people outside the academic arena, and perhaps many within it, at least all those who are unfamiliar with his academic work, would most probably think Andreas Papandreou was a hard-core Marxist. After all, Andreas was Trotskyite in his teens and later founded and led the Socialist party. Some might have heard of his book Paternalistic Capitalism and this title certainly reinforces the conviction that he was an outsider, a critic of the system. However between his teen years and those of his political leadership there is little indication of any Marxist influence.

His academic work begins squarely within the boundaries of orthodox economics and then only slowly shifts outside it, but never completely. Let me answer the question as to what kind of economist he was. He was an orthodox economist who was not satisfied with orthodox theory and who for that reason wished to improve it. Not to get rid of it. To make it better. To borrow from the world of psychology, he was engaged in a love-hate relationship with the neo-classical model. He wanted the theory to which he was married to be perfect, and though it wasn’t, it was still the best thing around.

Andreas Papandreou arrived in the United States on the eve of World War Two, having completed his first two years in the law school of Athens University. He remained in New York, working at Columbia University’s International House, thinking of continuing an education in law. When it was suggested that it would be more wise to follow economics rather than get an American law degree, a degree which would be of little use to him if he ever returned to his own country, he switched directions. In October of 1941 he arrived at Harvard, where, at the age of 22, on the basis of his two years at law school, he was immediately admitted into the doctoral program.

The economists he was to meet and work with in Cambridge were nothing short of stellar. His professors were people like Joseph Schumpeter, Abba Lerner, and W. J. Crum; students that had either just graduated from Harvard or were still working on their doctorates were people like Paul Samuelson, Robert Solow, John Galbraith, James Tobin, James Duesenberry, and Paul Sweezy.¹ Andreas was teaching assistant to James Tobin and Vassily Leontieff and taught both statistics and accounting.

Though I don’t have his Masters thesis, Andreas himself once told me that he wrote a very long masters thesis on Marxist thought and that his professor told him that because it was so long he wouldn’t read it but precisely because it was so long it was worth at least a B and that was the grade he gave him. Andreas Papandreou read his Marxism well and would return to it in later years, but his essential training was in neo-classical economics.

What books did he read? From his library, his footnotes and his Ph.D. thesis, it is clear that highly relevant to his early economic education were the works by Edward Chamberlin who had just published his The Theory of Monopolistic Competition (1939), while extremely relevant to Andreas Papandreou’s thinking was the work of Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932) and Schumpeter’s The Theory of Economic Development (1936). In this context I wish to mention another book by A. R. Burns, The Decline of Competition(1936) and Robert Triffin’s Monopolistic Competition and General Equilibrium Theory (1940). In the year he arrived at Harvard, Schumpeter, one of Andreas’ professors, would publish his magnificent Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. As for the previous generation, influential were Frank Knight and Maurice Dobbs and in particular Lionel Robbins, who had written hisEssay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science in 1935.

From this brief survey of what he was reading at the time, we can see that he was already interested in deviations from the neo-classical model of general equilibrium and perfectly competitive markets. For those of you who aren’t economists, let me briefly say that orthodox economics posits a world of perfectly competitive firms that can’t influence price. Andreas was concerned about a world that deviated from this assumption, a world for example, characterized by large, monopolistic firms.

He received his Ph.D. at the age of 24, in the fall of 1943, under the guidance of professor W. L. Crum. Titled The Location and Scope of the Entrepreneurial Function, it is a highly readable and accessible piece of work running about 350 pages long. Already Andreas is having doubts about the fundamental assumption of micro-economics: he is concerned about the validity of the proposition that the firm is a profit-maximizing agent.

In this work he traces the rise of the modern corporation in order to investigate an issue that occupied many economists at the time: just who exactly controls the modern corporation and what precisely is the role of the entrepreneur in a modern capitalist society.²

After a concise survey of the rise of the corporation from the middle ages onwards, he investigates the separation of ownership from entrepreneurship and looks in some detail at the various relationships between ownership and entrepreneurship that arise through holding companies and interlocking directorships. Rather than a corporation, he proposes the term “poly-corporation”, using the Greek word for the Latinate term multi because firms have now gone beyond the production of single products or participation in single markets. He classifies two hundred of the largest American firms by a novel system which accounts for the various levels of control and using a statistical technique he concludes that, in the majority of cases, at this point in time, entrepreneurship has indeed been separated from ownership, thus contributing empirical proof to the theses advanced by many economic thinkers of the time.

The shift in ownership challenges the validity of the profit-maximizing assumption. Entrepreneurial activity is, in certain cases, pursued for its own sake and thus deviates from the condition of profit-maximization.³ For the purposes of this exposition, whether this is true or not is not the point. The point is that Andreas Papandreou wanted to build his life on a theory that could be validated empirically and not on a castle of sand.

In 1943, fresh with his Ph.D., he joined America’s war effort and volunteered for the US Navy where, after serving as a male nurse at Bethesda hospital for war wounded, he was sent to California where he used the concepts of operational research to determine the optimal timing for fleet repairs.  When he returned to Harvard in 1946 he became an assistant professor (ifigitis) and in the fall of 1947 he went to Minnesota where he became associate professor in theoretical or micro-economics. (Ektaktos kathigitis)

In 1949 he published an article in the American Economic Review titled Market Structure and Monopoly Power. Here he is concerned with the power of large corporations in American society, and in particular with the fact that the legal framework for judging monopolistic behavior has not yet caught up with the new economics. The legal framework, he writes, “lacks the economist’s emphasis on consumer welfare.”⁴ From that article industrial economists coined the term the “Papandreou coefficient” which is an index of firm penetration in the market. The new element that he brought to the traditional measures of monopoly was that he included a firm’s capacity as an indication of its potential to strike back or to make life difficult for competitors by expanding supply and dropping price. He proposed an empirical method for testing his hypothesis.

In the period 1952-55 he received a grant from the Social Science Research Council to study logic and mathematics. In terms of his technical skills, set theory and topology have now come to the fore. At the same time he works as a consultant in the US justice department on anti-trust, a manifestation of his desire to marry theory to practice.

Besides the empirical work on monopolies, he pursues a parallel path of work on high theory. His concern with the relevance of economics is apparent throughout his research in the nineteen fifties. He wishes to test the basic axiom of economics. After all, what good is a theory if the assumptions on which it is constructed are false? He investigates a pillar of neo-classical economics, what is known as the theory of choice, and he does so through direct experimentation with small groups of people – something which has also come back into fashion in recent years. His paper, published in Econometrica in July of 1953, is titled An experimental test of an axiom in the Theory of Choice. Employing a stochastic (Bayesian) model, he shows that the axioms of the theory of choice cannot be rejected. In other words, he confirms one of the fundamental assumptions of neo-classical economics.⁵

This is ironic, for in the next few years he has serious doubts about the validity of the basic assumptions of neo-classical economics. In his 1952 piece, Some basic problems in the theory of the firm ⁶ he expresses reservations concerning the traditional definition of the firm – it needs improvement he says, it does not live up to the standards of theoretical rigor Andreas requires. Rather than examine the question empirically, as he did in his Ph.D. and his first published articles, he analyses the situation from a highly theoretical perspective.

What does he talk about? The neo-classical theory of the firm needs improvement, for one because it does not adequately reflect the actual way firms operate. For another, the theory of the firm as it stands is not general enough to be a real theory.

He wishes to find a universal classification of the firm. Only this will be intellectually satisfying for him. He provides a definition of the firm that encompass both the competitive firm as well as the monopolistic firm and beyond. It is not enough, in Papandreou’s mind, to define a firm by its goal or even its conduct. It is not enough to say that such and such an agent is a profit maximizer. The firm, according to him, should be treated as a specific case of the general phenomena of social organization and must include the internal decision-making process.

Under this classification, the firm becomes a system of communication and coordination, operating under a central authority. This more general definition allows for a firm that is fully competitive, but also allows for firms with large-scale management, firms with interlocking directorships, firms that are vertically integrated or even firms under a socialist system. This latter grouping, the firm under socialism, does not and I would say almost never occupies his time.

Finally, a proper theory of the firm must explain how a firm gets started, the operation of the firm itself, the functions of capital investment, expansion and external financing and how changes in direction, technological innovation and dropping and creating new products are decided upon.

For Andreas Papandreou relevance to the real world was of great concern; at the same time he believed that only a highly sophisticated theory could adequately describe the real world. In this battle between relevance and abstractedness lies an unresolvable “inner” tension which was to haunt him for the duration of his intellectual life. It is the intellectual’s desire for purity, I would say, that does not leave him alone. Again and again he turns to the question of finding a model that is generalizable enough so as to account for all systems – in which the model of perfect competition is more of a subset than the totality itself.

In short, if Papandreou is bothered by the existing approach to economics, if he is concerned about some of its fundamental assumptions, it’s not that he wants to replace or reject it and come up with a completely different paradigm and turn say to Marxism, it is that he wishes it to become a more intellectually powerful tool with greater applicability to explain the world.

One direction for economics to go, he argues as far back as 1950 (Economics and the social sciences, Economic Journal, Vol. LX, No. 240, December 1950) is to utilize the findings of other social sciences.

This procedure calls for a careful inventorying of all the tentatively valid propositions of psychology, anthropology and sociology in an effort to equip economics with the tools necessary to impose restrictions upon the relations among economic variables in order that operationally meaningful hypotheses may be formulated.

Without “reaching out” to use modern parlance, to other fields of knowledge, economics reaches an impasse.

In Economics as a science, published in 1958, he goes beyond the issue of the firm and begins to probe the overall structure of economics itself. Using set theory and logical proofs, using the system of deduction and induction, he attempts to show, among other things, that the science of economics cannot make predictions. Economists like Samuelson and Friedman argued that it’s not so important to worry about the assumptions of the model — as long as it can make predictions. Now along comes Andreas Papandreou and argues, using elegant math, that it cannot in fact do so. If this is true, we are in very shallow water indeed. Not only is economics problematic in its assumptions, but its key claim to fame, that it is at least useful, is also problematic. In this book he also lays the foundations for a more general economic theory, one that allows for greater variety of economic behavior. Perhaps for most it is too advanced. I myself am unable to comprehend its mathematics.⁷

It is not enough for him that a model is internally consistent. Papandreou wants a theory whose basic propositions can be empirically tested and then rejected or accepted. I think that ideally he wishes to see a grand theory that would allow for all states of the world – for example a theory that could take under its wing not only capitalism but also feudalism, mercantilism, perfect competition, and monopolistic competition, or I suppose today, “globalization.” What he’s looking for, it seems to me, is the equivalent of the Unified Field Theory in physics – an overall theory that could account for the shifts in the underlying structure of the world economy.

Given this very high intellectual standard, it is no wonder that he grew increasingly frustrated with orthodox economics. From they very first he pursued the study of monopolies, a blatant contradiction to the traditional theory of perfect competition.

By the late sixties and early seventies his focus shifts, but only by a few degrees. He is now also concerned with how theories themselves come about.⁸ It is not enough to posit states of the world – a difficult task in itself. It is also of interest to examine the specific social events that lead to the development of certain theories what Andreas calls meta-economics — theory construction.

The emergence of totalitarian states in the thirties, for instance, and the experience of the second world war caused intellectuals, especially those from Europe like Debreu, to propose a theory of the economy where the agents are atomistic and highly individualistic. This emphasis on the individual is a response to the fascist and communist emphasis on collective action which relegates individual needs below the all-powerful but indeterminate “higher good.” Thus, he argues, the post-war economists who more or less determined the neo-classical model emphasized, for historical and political reasons, the atomistic model.⁹

But if this is true, then it means that theory is actually influenced by social events. In what sense can we claim that it is theory and not ideology? Schumpeter, Andreas argued, spent his life arguing that economics was not ideology but objective science. But that shows that the argument for the prosecution was not a trivial one if Schumpeter spent so much time on the side of the defense.

In one of his class lectures, (Michigan lectures, 1973) Andreas talked about Kenneth Arrow, his former colleague who was in the news because he had just been awarded the Nobel prize. ¹⁰He told his Ann Arbor graduate seminar that Arrow was an economist who believed that the traditional frame of reference was enough to solve all problems, even problems that seemed to have no place in the model, such as distribution and inequality of information. (I would add also the problems of increasing returns to scale and externalities.) For Arrow these are concerns that distort the performance of the market but which, not to worry, will be solved in due time. There is no need, therefore, to drop the original theory and work for another one.

In Andreas’ words, Arrow believes that “if we work harder and get more information, develop better theoretical tools, we’ll do better.” Andreas doesn’t buy this at all. Why doesn’t he? Andreas believed that such problems required a re-working of the fundamental assumptions. For example, economists assume a model populated by competitive firms but do not care if the world doesn’t fit that proposition and he argues that most economists have abandoned the effort to test the fundamental hypotheses of economics as a criterion for its relevance.

How was it possible, he wondered in these lectures, to be part of a profession that claimed it could model and represent society mathematically and yet it not only failed to take into account fundamental shifts in the underlying shape of the modern capitalism society but also rejected (in the extreme case of Friedman) the importance of such changes on the fundamental model of perfect competition? Does not history play any role in the field of economics?

It was now time to write his own analysis of the world as he saw it which he did in the book, Paternalistic Capitalism (1972). He wrote it during a difficult but productive time, while in exile in Canada, between making speeches against the Greek junta that had once jailed him, while teaching, running a “liberation movement” and also squeezing in ‘quality’ time for family life. ¹¹

He now fully believed that orthodox interpretations of capitalism were ideologically loaded and wished to propose his own “synthesis” as he called it, a new presentation of capitalism that differed from conventional wisdom. He begins, where else, with the problems that concerned him since his first intellectual engagement with the field of economics thirty years ago, back in 1943.

In the sixty page introduction he returns to his initial concern about the role of the firm in society and agrees with the Galbraithian analysis of the firm as being run by a “technostructure.” Technology has removed control from the owners and placed it in the hands of the industrial managers and technocrats. It is clear from our discussion how prepared Andreas Papandreou was to receive Galbraith’s ideas about the large firms that try to control the market uncertainties by eliminating the market wherever they can – either through buying out firms from which they purchase inputs or through price arrangements or, when possible, through complete control over natural resources.¹²

Baran and Sweezy’s concept of monopolistic capitalism and the role of the military-industrial state also found fertile ground in Andreas’ efforts to come up with his own analysis. He relates the managerial elite to the national security managers and shows that paternalistic capitalism – in short the capitalism as expressed by the workings of the American economy must be aggressively expansive.¹³

Yet having written Paternalistic Capitalism, is Andreas Papandreou happy? I think not. He is too much of an intellectual to be satisfied with a book that “only” describes the way the world works. What he wants, what attracts his mind, is high theory. He wants a serious model of the serious world.

In the introduction to Paternalistic Capitalism he says as much. Yes, it might be true that neo-classical economics, he says, has little to say about the behavior of modern capitalism. Yes it might be true that it is fraught with inconsistencies. But it is also true that so far at least, it’s the best thing we have. We have no other theory that is as logically coherent or as convincing to replace it. His own hypothesis, his Paternalistic Capitalism, is only a partial explanation. This is a brave admission.

This discussion is based on only  partial reading of his works. I come away with the sense that Andreas Papandreou, had he pursued his academic career to its fruition, would have made life very difficult for the pure theory economists. Not only would he have been a constant critic of neo-classical economics, using the tools of topology and calculus to take them on, but he would also have advanced the field of history of science and the epistemology and methodology of economics.

Perhaps his dream of coming up with a model where the fundamental assumptions are more realistic and empirically verifiable would not have been realized, but it would have been interesting to have seen where he would have taken it. But to have gone in that direction would have meant robbing another world from his talents. In the end he chose not only to understand the world but to change it.

Thank You

An Andreas Papandreou Bibliography

Articles

Marketing Structure and Monopoly Power
in the American Economic Review, September 1949.

Economics and the Social Sciences
in the Economic Journal, December 1950.

Types of Empirical Relevance in Modern Economics
in Economia Internazionale, May 1952.

An Experimental Test of an Axiom in the Theory of Choice
in Econometrica, July 1953.

Testing Assumptions Underlying Economic Predictions
in collaboration with O. E. Brownlee in the Business News Notes, University of Minnesota, May 1954.

A Test of a Proposition in the Theory of Choice
in Econometrica, July 1955.

Models, Comparative, Statistics, and Empirical Relevance
in Econometrica, volume 25, number 4, pages 600-601, October 1955.

Concentration and Public Policy
in the Iowa Business Digest, February 1956.

The Economic Effect of Trademarks
in the California Law Review, volume 44, number 3, pages 503-510, July 1956.

Explanation and Prediction in Economics
in Science, April 24, 1959.

Risk
in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1959.

Macroeconomics Models and Economic Policy
in the Archive of Economic and Social Sciences, volume 39, pages 523-552, October-December 1959, Athens.

The American Economy and its Future (in Greek)
in Spoudes, volume 9, pages 1-7, Athens, 1959-60.

Partial Structures of Economic Regulators
in collaboration with A. A. Lazaris in Spoudes, volume 9, pages 1-8, Athens, 1959-60.

The Course of Economic Thought
in Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali, Seventh year (1960), number 4, pages 325-335.

Theory Construction and Empirical Meaning in Economics
in the American Economic Review, May 1963.

Cold-War Blocks and National Independence
in the Review of International Affairs, January 5, 1970.

Some Basic Issues in Development Planning
in The Challenge, under the auspices of the Advisory Committee of Economic Development, Winnipeg, 1971.

Greece: An American Problem
in The Massachusetts Review, pages 655-671, Autumn 1971.

Greece: Neocolonialism and Revolution
in the Monthly Review, volume 24, December 1972.

Planning and Freedom
in the Review of International Affairs, Belgrade, July 1970.

A Tradegy Without a Mask (in Italian)
in Il Ponte, March 1970.

The Multinational Corporation
in The Canadian Forum and The Journal of Finance, volume 28, number 2, May 1972.

The Multinational Corporation
in The American Economist, volume 17, number 2, pages 154-160, autumn 1973.

Multinational Corporations and Empire
in Social Praxis, volume 1, number 2, pages 105-118, 1973.

In Greece as in Cambodia
in the Monthly Review, volume 25, September 1973.

Superpower Dynamics and the Outlook for the Mediterranean
in the Information Paper No. 7. The Middle East: Five Perspectives. Proceedings of AAUG, Berkeley 1972 (published in December 1973).

The Metropolis – Periphery Polarity: A Facet of Imperialism
in Social Praxis, 2 (1-2) pages 7-23, 1974.

Greece: The November Uprising
in the Monthly Review, volume 25, pages 8-21, February 1974.

Marxism: Looking Backward and Forward
in the Monthly Review, volume 26, pages 67-71, June 1974.

Confrontation and Coexistence
in the Monthly Review, volume 29, pages 14-21, April 1978.

Books

An Introduction to Social Science: Personality, Work, Community
in collaboration with A. Naftalin, B. Nelson, M. Sibley and D. Calhoun. Lippincott, 1953 (revised editions: 1957, 1961)

Competition and its Regulation
in collaboration with J. T. Wheeler. Prentice-Hall, 1954.

Economics as a Science
Lippincott, 1958
Greek translation: By A. A. Lazaris, University School of Industry, Piraeus, 1960.

Spanish translation: (La Economica come Siencia) by J. R. Lasuen and M. Xacristan. Ediciones Ariel, 1961.
Italian translation: (L’ Economia come Scienza) by Mario Arcelli. L’ Industria, 1962.

Policy of the Economic Development of Greece (in Greek)
Centre of Economic Research, Athens, 1962. Translated into English.

Basic Principles of the Creation of Models in Macroeconomics (in Greek)
Centre of Economic Research, Athens, 1962.

Introduction to Macroeconomic Models
Centre of Economic Research, Athens, 1962.
Italian translation and comments: (Introduzione ai Modelli Macroeconomici) by C. Lunghini Instituto Nazionale per lo Studio della Congiuntura, 1967.

Democracy and National Rebirth (in Greek)
Fexis, Athens, 1966.

Toward a Totalitarian World?
Swedish translation: (Mot en Totalitar Varld?). Norstedts, Stockholm, 1969.
Norwegian translation: (Mot en Totalitaer Verden?) introduction by Finn Gystavsen, Oslo. Bax Furlag, 1969.
Finnish translation: (Hyvasti Demokratia). Kirjayhtyma, Helsinki, 1969.
Dutch translation: (Naar een Totalitaire Wereld?). Utrecht Antwerpen. A. W. Bruna & Zoon, 1970.

Man’s Freedom
Columbia University Press, New York, 1970.
Greek translation published by Agonas, 1973.

Democracy at Gunpoint: The Greek Front
Doubleday & Co., New York, 1970.
Greek translation published by Karanassi, Athens, 1974.
Translated also into Swedish, Norwegian, Danish, Finnish and German. Pelican Books (Paperback).

Paternalistic Capitalism
The University of Minnesota Press, Spring 1972
Greek translation: published by Karanassi, Athens, 1974.
Italian translation: (Il Capitalismo Paternalistico). Isedi, Milan, April, 1972.
Spanish translation: (El Capitalismo Paternalista). Alianza Editorial, Madrid, 1973.
German translation: (Kritik des Amerikanischen Kapitalismus). Herder & Horder, Frankfurt, 1973
Arabic translation: (Autocratic Capitalism). Al-Talia Publishing Co., Beirut, 1973

Project Selection for National Plans
in collaboration with U. Zohar. Praeger Publishers, New York, 1974.

The Impact Approach to Project Selection
in collaboration with U. Zohar.

The Method of Repercussions in Investment Selection (in Greek)
Praeger Publishers, New York, 1974.

Greece to the Greeks (in Greek)
published by Karanassi, Athens, 1976.

Imperialism and Economic Development (in Greek)
published by Nea Synora, Athens, 1975.

Transition to Socialism
published by Echme, Athens, 1977 (second edition, 1978).

Mediterranean Socialism (in Italian)
(Il Socialismo Mediterraneo). Lerici, Cosenza, 1977.

For a Socialist Society (in Greek)
published by Echme, Athens, 1977 (second edition, 1978).

Contributions to Books

Some Basic Problems in the Theory of the Firm
(A volume in the series “Survey of Contemporary Economics” published by B. F. Haley, Irwin, 1952).

An Experimental Test of Proposition in the Theory of Choice
(Consumer Behavior, New York University Press, 1954).

Linear Planning – A New Instrument of National Decisions (in Greek)
(University School of Industry, Piraeus, Athens, 1960).

Order of the Day for a Policy of Economic Development
(University School of Industry, Piraeus, Athens, 1960).

Policy of the Blocs: Intervention and Freedom of the Institutions
(Les Temps Modernes by Jean-Paul Sartre, 1969).

Introduction to a book by Norodom Sihanouk and M. Burchett
entitled My War with the CIA: Cambodia: Fight for Survival

Social Planning in a Regional Framework
(Social Issues in Regional Policy and Regional Planning, Mouton, 1977).

Essays

A Test of a Stochastic Theory of Choice
University of California, Publications of Economics, volume 16, number 1, pages 1-18, University of California Press, 1957.

Planning for the Appointment of Resources for Economic Development
Centre of Economic Studies, Athens, 1962.

The Political Element in Economic Development
Wicksell Lectures, Stockholm, 1966
Spanish translation: (El Elemento Politico en el Desarollo Economico), published by Depalma, Buenos Aires, 1973.

A New Economic Policy for Greece (in Greek)
Athens, 1965.

Economic Development, Balance of Payments and Policy of Industrialisation (in Greek)
Athens, 1965.

Economic Development – Rhetoric and Reality
The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, 1973.